INTRODUCTION
The first serious attempt to criminalize war and prosecute individuals associated with war crimes and crimes against humanity took place at the close of World War I (WWI) at Versailles, under the investigation of a group
The Versailles model of punitive redress focused on criminalizing the German state through a deprivation of basic sovereign rights, a limitation on economic growth potential, and an internationally administered demilitarization. Though ultimately unsuccessful at prosecuting Germany's Kaiser for violations of "international morality" and the sanctity of treaties, and blamed for the breakdown in the European order less than two decades later, this failed attempt laid a foundation for creating a judicial structure for pursuing the construction of international criminal law at the conclusion of the Second World War (WWII). 4 In 1945, developments in the prosecution of individual violators by international courts came to the forefront of the international arena. It was 5 hypothesized that ready acceptance of the parties to form this new type of judicial mechanism was, at least in part, a reaction to the failures of the Versailles model at the conclusion of WWI. The construction of the body of 6 international criminal law utilized at Nuremberg was a first success and 7 represented a sui generis method of addressing the dichotomatic friction between an area of law historically dominated by the authority of sovereign nations and the objective to prosecute individuals in that forum. 8 As frequently addressed in academia today, international criminal law must balance many tensions besides that between its historical state framework and modern individualized objective. The judicial mechanisms 9 face criticisms of prescribing victors' justice in a system of law that must define crimes for an international population: definitions which require determinations of the validity of relativistic moral perspectives. Additionally, 10 there exists a certain amount of friction between the various articulated goals of this body of law, making simultaneous fulfillment of all the roles something 11. HANNA ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 5-9 (1963) (describing Arendt's frustrations with the history making function of the Court in the Eichmann trial, noting that the attempts to write history lead to banal trials).
12. CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 23-24. of an Odyssean quest for the Court. Indeed, the entire body of international 11 criminal law is precariously balanced over the fault lines where theoretical justice and the hard realities of law come together and meet: a definitive noman's land for law.
Legal scholars on the subject articulate the goals motivating the impetus and continued justification of international criminal law as including retribution, deterrence, history making, rehabilitation, and education, but at the forefront of this list is the duty of conferring a sense of justice to the population affected by atrocity. This sentiment has been echoed in the Tokyo 12 proceedings of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) when Justice Röling of the Netherlands spoke to the function of the "principles of justice" within the obligations of the Tribunal itself saying, "the first duty of the Tribunal [is] to mete out justice." Additionally, in the 2003 Nikoliae case at the 13 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it was asserted that considerations of punishment at the international tribunal reflect "the calls for justice from the persons who have-directly or indirectly-been victims of the crimes." 14 The problem with justice as it concerns international criminal law is that, like many of the more theoretical pillars on which the law is generally constructed, it is a broad term with a number of meanings. At its broadest 15 level, justice is defined as a derivative of fairness. The idea of "justice as 16 fairness" has been articulated by Justice Jackson in his opening statement for the prosecution of the Nuremberg trials, and has been reaffirmed in many holdings of various international criminal tribunals. Even so, considering 17 philosophical texts on the subject, the idea of fairness can be broken down further into several key factors. A common theme running through many national justice systems is the idea of justice as unbiased, as free from political influence, and as a law created in a neutral setting. 18 Scholarly articles on the effectiveness of international criminal tribunals and the emerging body of international criminal law abound. Within this 19 body of text, a common theme of questions emerges as to how justice is obtained, dispensed, and enforced. However, examinations of the origins and 20 substantive definition of this central goal seem altogether lacking in relevance toward the fundamental idea of this theme. It seems important, before we ask ourselves how well this body of international criminal law functions in various fora, to pose the question: Is this representation of justice the most effective scheme we can apply to accomplish the defined goals of international criminal law? For a body of law with such a potentially broad basis of application and with such lofty ambitions as international justice, the more proper question should be: Whose justice are we administering?
Curiously, many scholars begin their study of the historical influences on this body of law with a discussion on the post-decolonization period, which involves questions on how nations with equal sovereign rights form and navigate relationships. However, the birth of international law, and thus, the 21 structures and methodologies which influence international criminal law, stretch much further back than this limited historiography. potentially an unsavory point to illuminate, many of the structures of international criminal law have been influenced by the imperial period, an era marked by development of the idea of sovereign rights and access to those rights that was not based on equality as much as on hegemony. Reflected in 23 the historical residue of hegemonic influence is the reality that the motive of the civilizing mission of the colonial era has been, and may continue to be, perpetuated within the legal structures of contemporary international criminal law. Additionally, one of the main challenges to the justice international criminal law seeks to prescribe is the political influence inherent in the very nature of the body of law. Unlike other criminal law structures at the 24 national level, when prosecuting a national military leader for war crimes or crimes against humanity on an international scale, it becomes impossible to divorce the political element. Therefore, in a definitively neo-colonialist flavor, the international legal arena leaves the use of force in international and civil relations untouchable as a sovereign prerogative but punishable after the fact, if such acts fall outside the accepted norms of the shared conception of international society. However, according to Justice Röling in 1945, such a 25 unified society did not exist, and the "sense of shared moral purpose, cultural affinity and political direction necessary to the criminalization of sovereign behavior was absent." As such, the resulting system is inherently defined by 26 the political motives of certain power players and simultaneously claims to produce a justice-product untouched by that very political influence.
To this end, this article seeks to explore the relation of the origins of international criminal law and the administration of "justice" based on these constraints. This analysis is addressed in three Parts. Part I considers the historical origins of the international law that has ultimately affected or become part of international criminal law. This Part concentrates on the elements that contributed directly to defining the boundaries of the international society of states, the conditions required for membership in that community, and the maturation of sovereign identity as it pertains to those considered outside this community. Considering sovereignty specifically, this Part examines the potential effects of the historical imperial nature on the post-decolonization interaction of states and other sovereign institutions of 27 international law, illustrating that various colonial ideologies present in the administration and methodologies of international interactions were not likely discrete anomalies, corrected by decolonization efforts.
27
Part II will then build off this historical view of the doctrine of sovereignty and its associated immunities to consider the modern underlying 28 political elements potentially creating cultural bias behind contemporary international criminal law. This analysis will evaluate how these elements affect the functionality of this doctrine in today's international criminal courts by considering three contemporary issues. These issues will clarify the validity of existing accusations of the Court's neo-colonial approach to sovereign immunities. For modern legal scholars, these specific issues offer vignettes on the contemporary character and restrictions of the doctrine of sovereignty, thus illustrating international criminal law in light of both its historical influence and political nature.
In consideration of this analysis of past and contemporary influences manipulating the morphology of the rights associated with the doctrine of sovereignty, Part III will outline the prescriptive contribution of this Article. The challenges facing international criminal courts today and the concerns of legal scholars suggest that as international criminal law moves forward, it will be essential to acknowledge that both the historical precedent and political influence cannot be divorced from the specific nature of justice prescribed by these institutions. This is not to suggest that these influences make the tribunals ineffective or obsolete. It does, however, highlight the need, as international criminal law becomes more formalized, to limit and curb the expected functionality of the courts and tribunals in light of this nature. In particular, this Article seeks to illuminate the resulting injustice of a continued indifference of the international community toward the biases inherent in the political character and historical origins of international law. was based on a Eurocentric concept of a civilized state which was accepted into the elite club of sovereign and the domination of those outside that sphere. Naturally, the concept of sovereignty has evolved through its 29 acceptance in the customary international law of states. Regardless of the 30 transformative quality of the concept of sovereignty, however, its prominent place and importance to international law is undoubted.
31
To understand international criminal law, it is essential to analyze its historical precedent: the evolution of the law of nations. Despite the similar 32 sources of these two bodies of law, the motives toward jurisprudential development differ in that international law was developed to address the rights and obligations of the state, whereas international criminal law seeks to define and address the duties deemed actionable for the individual within an international sphere. Perhaps because of this distinction, it has been argued 33 that any corrupt elements utilized in the development of international law have been effectively purged and are thus of minimal consequence to considerations of current questions of the theoretical and substantive problems of international criminal law. However, the classical system, both from a 34 philosophical and doctrinal perspective, has never been rejected in its entirety.
35
Many of the most fundamental concepts of the state system still utilized were first developed from the need for a homogeneous method to control affairs between the independent states in Western Europe (which had, by the end of the reign of Frederic III in 1493, established themselves successfully) and the New World, into which these "developed" nations sought to expand.
36
Although Hugo Grotius is most commonly acknowledged as the father of international law, Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth-century Spanish theologian and jurist, is in reality the source of several of the most important themes 37 42. The main difference in the emphasis of secular systems of law and natural law was the instigation of the right of a nation to sovereignty. However, the Indians to whom Vitoria was applying this formulation ended up in much the same place under this new law. Vitoria argued that a sovereign must possess the power to declare and exercise all the rights of war. Unsurprisingly, the fundamental premise of his argument held that the Indians, because of their status as Saracens were inherently incapable of waging a just war, and thus the premise ensured that the Indians were excluded from the realm of sovereignty. This determination of sovereign rights effectively put the power of legal recognition of states into the hands of the political rulers of European powers. ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 23-31.
43. Historians of the period tend to see the nineteenth century as extending up to 1914, as it is generally the commencement of the First World War, which marks the true end of this era. For the purposes of legal scholars and for this article we will consider the nineteenth-century in its final decades, from roughly 1870 (the culmination of the Franco-German war) into the commencement of WWI. See ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 1875-1914 (1987) . currently utilized in this body of law. Though notable for his many 37 contributions to the nature of relations between European powers and the indigenous peoples of colonized territories, the advancement that should be distinguished in reference to this Article is his articulation of the significance of law, and the importance of it underscoring any and all action in colonial enterprise.
38
Before Vitoria's repudiation of traditional techniques for characterizing relations between the Spanish and the indigenous populations of their colonial territories, these relationships were based on medieval jurisprudence giving the Pope universal authority. Vitoria argued that this power should shift from 39 the Pope to the sovereign, and thus set into motion the question of the right to sovereignty. It was for this differentiation that Vitoria was credited as a 40 defender of the native. However, in the same gesture and under the guise of sovereignty, Vitoria instigated a more acceptable "moral and legal basis for the subjugation" of these populations. For the indigenous Native population, 41 Vitoria's sovereignty was just as elusive as a Christian status because although the idea of sovereignty was not linked with theological alignment, it was still awarded only to populations of "civilized" society. 42 These first fledgling developments in international law would be articulated and solidified into a concept of sovereignty several hundred years later in the era which scholars refer to as the "long nineteenth century." 43 Whether based on economic, financial, or cultural motives, one of the most important components utilized by the colonizing power to justify the civilizing mission both to the indigenous population and the Western metropole was the 44 law and the justice it would provide to the "backward peoples" of these 44 territories. Law offered both a justification and bargaining tool to the 45 colonial powers for their actions and, inversely, it was through the expansion inspired by colonialism that international law became universal.
46
The approach of the naturalists, described first by Vitoria and then expanded upon by legal and international scholars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, asserted that the universal quality of international laws and rights, including that of sovereignty, derived from human reason and, as such, applied to all peoples. The changing world of the imperial nations put 47 great pressure on the academic and legal community to craft these ideas into a more utile concept in light of the colonial mission. Positivist international theory suggests that there is a distinguishing characteristic between civilized states and non-civilized states that creates a duty of recognition and application of the sovereignty doctrine only to those states which comprise "the civilized family of nations." However, if the application of sovereignty 48 was limited to civilized states, it created a presumption that European powers also had to assume an international responsibility and a role of greater governance over non-sovereign territories. 57. ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 91-94. Ironically, the treaty was deemed a tool too valuable to the imperialist powers to give up completely and so concept of sovereignty was mutilated again so that treaties continued to be utilized, as a notification method between imperial powers of territorial possession.
58. Id.; see also LINDLEY, supra note 44, at 160-80. so that even the customary international law of states could not touch his power.
52
At this zenith of power, the sovereign doctrine was given its supremacy by the presence of a society which consented to sovereign rule. However, this society was also specifically delineated and classified into civilized and noncivilized categories. The territorial lines were thus legally drawn, leaving the majority of sovereign states in Europe. The responsibility of the European 53 sovereign state as to non-sovereign territories and the division of the remaining territory among the colonizing empires was the central preoccupation of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. In order to assure 54 peaceful relations among the European powers who were already vying for territorial control on the African continent, it became essential to diplomatically carve the region between the powers and organize the colonial "African scramble" of the period.
55
Though international law did little to control the rising tensions of territorial greed among the European powers, it effectively justified the transformation of Africa into a conceptual terra nullius, redefining the 56 sovereignty that had been promoted to the indigenous populations. In essence, it was "negotiated" away from them and nullified in the treaties that had previously resulted from these interactions based on the idea that these peoples were too primitive to understand the concept of their own sovereignty. Terra nullius offered both a clean slate on which to build the 57 ever expanding empire and a way to assert control over the "rampant abuse by European adventurers of the treaty mechanism." Thus, sovereignty was 58 altered under political pressures by European power states to more easily suit their social and economic goals. 59 . ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 95 (arguing that this consent was particularly irregular and distorted from what we think of as consent today in theories of contract); Keal, supra note 36, at 200 (noting that free consent was necessary only from governments possessing "international validity," although the exact constraints of civilization depended on which legal scholar you spoke to at the conference 65. See Colonialism, supra note 27, at 549 (noting that the Mandate System only applied to the territories "formerly annexed to Germany and the Ottoman Empire").
66. SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS 179-81 (1996) (arguing that the idea of sovereign territorial rights and immunities were concrete ideas accepted in international law, rights that came only with the institutional features characterized by Western states that were sovereign).
Despite the fact that no African representation was included in the proceedings of the Berlin Conference, the legal personality of the African tribes was addressed, but only to make the decision to permit the indigenous nation the ability to "consent" to territorial conquest permissible solely on the fulfillment of the requirements of a "civilized population." A representative 59 from the Lagos Observer reported with eerie accuracy at the conclusion of the conference: "Africa is helpless to prevent [such high-handed robbery] . . . . It is on cards that this 'Christian' business can only end, at no distant date, in the annihilation of the natives." 60 Regarding those territories and tribal nations newly lacking in the ability to withhold consent from occupation, vis-à-vis sovereignty, the legal question for the colonizer was simple: the non-sovereign entity simply lacked legal standing to assert opposition. 73. League of Nations Covenant art. 22 paras. 1-2 (noting that the primary and substantive obligation undertaken by the mandatory power as stated in Article 22 of the League Covenant articulates that the concept was built on a "sacred trust of civilization." It is important also to note that the impetus for this humanitarian project was ultimately found in the work of Vitoria, who articulated the idea that the indigenous Indians could not have sovereignty because they were not "capable of controlling themselves.").
74. See U.N. Charter arts. 7, 39-41, 51; Colonialism, supra note 27, at 525-28.
process was meant to transition various colonial problems into issues of the past. However, modern attempts of former colonial powers to assert 67 jurisdictional authority over their colonies, and the resulting tenuous resolutions to those disputes, paint a different picture.
68
It was presumed that decolonization was an end to an era in itself and that the new law, expressed in the United Nations Charter, would usher in a new age of universal principles. At the most basic level, during the process of 69 decolonization, the rights and privileges related to sovereignty and selfdetermination remained grounded in historically and morally Western views. 70 While the process of decolonization transformed the holders of political power from external states to the African nations themselves, the structures of domination that had been developed at the legal institutional level remained definitively biased toward hegemonic Western powers in the international forum. 71 The development of sovereign identities for colonial territories under the mandate system of the League of Nations was characterized by a slow and, at times, capricious process for the peoples seeking independence and state rights. Ironically, this process seemed heavily influenced by the previous 72 Western classifications of "civilized countries" found in international law.
73
The territories under the mandate system were classified according to their "degree of advancement," which was directly coupled with the Eurocentric quality of the material and moral well-being of the inhabitants of the mandate territories and the replacement of any lingering local legal mechanism with a system mirroring that of the previous colonizer, meaning a distinctly Westerndemocratic emphasis. Sovereignty would only be allotted to those states that 78. See generally Kennedy, supra note 34 (illustrating in a rather one-sided argument the lack of cases from this period that remain well cited today).
79. BENTON, supra note 45, at 279 (highlighting the idea that sovereignty has developed a definite space within the international discourse, even if that space is built more on a myth than a physical truth).
could prove themselves "Western enough" to deserve the right. As Anghie notes, "the very definition of international law retained the concept of civilization that had been used in the nineteenth century to exclude nonEuropean states." Through the decolonization process, the intense moral 75 fervor of the Western-world was "embedded, instrumentalized, and institutionalized in the project of international criminal law." The 76 decolonization process therefore became not a mechanism of justice between state actors but one used to perpetuate the myth of a universal right to sovereignty free from Western-centric influence.
However, the interest of powerful states, leading up to and during the decolonization period, obviously lacked the intention of permitting colonial nations the same access to the sovereign rights those Western states had enjoyed since the development of the concept. The international law system therefore became an expression of Western-centric self-interest. Interestingly, the imperial chapter in the history of international law is, for the most part, 77 left entirely without historical reference. Most legal historians begin and end their historical analysis after the termination of WWII with the creation of the UN and with the question of organization among sovereign states, thus dismissing the hegemonic foundations of many of the key concepts in international law.
While the case history for this period is limited, the lack of substantive 78 legal argument is not the important contribution that surfaces today in international law. The construction of the state-system negotiation techniques-the requirements to enter into treaty and the limitations on sovereign rights-remain the most enduring causative element. The shifting 79 definition of sovereignty is one of the major problems that international criminal law is dealing with today. In the dialogue on these arguments, the continuation of Western powers' efforts to change the shape of sovereignty is visible both in the heterogeneous access to its protections and the malleability show trials are "politics unconstrained by trial or judicial process," the 83 political influence associated with the nature of international criminal law is on a significantly more minor level. While international law is indeed more readily influenced by politics than a national system of criminal law would be, it can be easily differentiated from the famous "show trials" of history.
All justice is uniquely dependent to some degree on subjective perspective and thus on a type of manifested political opinion. Trials on 
A. The Special Court for Sierra Leone and Jurisdictional Issues Surrounding the Indictment of Charles Taylor
The case-by-case disparity in the definition and access to sovereign immunities in historical and contemporary contexts affects both the role of the state and the rights of the individual under international law and international criminal law. One recurring question in modern day examples of this issue 89 is the degree of immunity enjoyed by Heads of State when sought for prosecutorial purposes by an international criminal court.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 to try those leaders bearing "greatest responsibility" for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious 90 violations of international humanitarian law committed by various internal groups within Sierra Leone "during a decade of brutal conflict involving at least four armed factions." The Sierra Leone Court, like other "mixed or 91 hybrid" courts, was established pursuant to a bilateral treaty with the goal of grafting an international reach onto the already present judicial system of the country. However, UN-backed hybrid criminal courts are distinguished from 92 the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia in that they lack foundation through the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council. 95. Jalloh, supra note 93, at 165. 96. SCSL, supra note 90, art. I, ¶ 1 (arguing that this power is intended as a method for the UN to restore international peace and security, and as such are coercive in the sense of being binding on all UN Member States. The Special Court for Sierra Leone lacks this power. Court's holding articulated that Belgium had breached its international duties, simply by "circulating internationally the arrest warrant," without considering the implications of potential further actions along this path. 106 In its judgment, the ICJ considered the Statutes of the ICTR, ICTY and ICC as well as the father of these non-immunity provisions found in the Nuremberg Charter. The court clearly articulated under which provisions 107 serious crimes of this nature could be prosecuted regardless of immunity:
First, persons may be tried in their home courts; second, they may be prosecuted if the State waives the immunity; third, they may be prosecuted, once they cease to 108 hold office, for crimes committed in a private capacity; and fourth, they may be prosecuted before international criminal courts where such courts have jurisdiction.
108
The fourth provision is essential to emphasize in regards both to the Taylor indictment by the SCSL and the arrest warrant issued by the ICC for the Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. As discussed earlier, the indictment 109 of Taylor could fit into only the fourth of these provisions, and then only if the international court seeking jurisdiction had successfully asserted jurisdiction over the individual. Where an international or national court exercises jurisdiction it is asserting a form of sovereignty. Where this jurisdiction is 110 asserted by an international court or extraterritorially by national courts, the defined borders of these asserted sovereignties conflict.
Although retaining the purity of sovereign immunity and its universal application for all countries, in contrast to international values as articulated only by those states that have joined specific international organizations, communities, and treaties. Notably, the holding of the Court lacked definition on the issues of the characteristics identifying a competent international court or tribunal and what grounds would justify the dispensing of personal immunities based on sovereignty. This lack of definition has caused and will continue to cause much confusion on this issue until a solidly defined approach can be officially adopted.
C. The Immunities of Al Bashir in Light of Security Council Referrals
A similar set of events, which considers the extension of sovereign immunity powers to non-Western Heads of State and which is still taking shape today, involves the referral by the UN Security Council to the ICC of the recent violence bordering on the level of human rights violation unfolding in Sudan. The ICC, like the mixed court of Sierra Leone, was not created While there is nothing in the ICC Statute to expand the Court's jurisdiction over a lack of national enforcement against human rights violations, the potential for jurisdictional coverage over the international crimes, articulated in the Statute, is limited only by states not becoming signatory parties to the Statute. 121 In 2004, acting on the request of the Security Council under Chapter VII powers, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant for the sitting President of Sudan. The request for surrender was circulated to not only the 122 Sudanese authorities and those states who were parties to the Statute of the ICC but also to all UN Security Council members that were not state parties to the ICC Statute. Additionally, the ICC ordered that the warrant be 123 circulated to any other state "which may be necessary for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir." This action, in theory, placed under the 124 jurisdictional reach of the ICC not only those states who had agreed to the ICC Statutes provisions but also those members of the UN who had not signed that agreement. Even if it is assumed that customary international law dictates that personal immunities of Heads of State are inapplicable in cases of criminal jurisdiction exercised by international criminal courts, the request for states to disregard sovereign immunity rights and surrender the requested individuals to the Court effectively reshapes the sovereign boundaries not only between the ICC and the state in question, but between that state and other states who might under this direction "lawfully" disregard this personal sovereign immunity. 125 Again, it is important to note that the immunity protecting incumbent Heads of State from domestic charges of crimes on an international scale and prosecution for those crimes is clearly defined and accepted under customary international law. In the Yerodia case, the ICJ spoke directly to the reach of 126 the ICC Statute in questions of immunities of Heads of State, holding that such immunities "shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person." Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute echoes this sentiment. 127 128
The emphasis of its international court status signifies that unlike the national court of Belgium in the Yerodia case, the ICC has the authority to issue and circulate an international arrest warrant for the crimes under its jurisdictional the idea of sovereign immunity as part of the accepted body of customary international law and has constructed its jurisdictional capacity in acquiescence of this accepted and significant tradition.
136
Since the birth of modern international criminal courts at Nuremberg, one of the greatest threats to international criminal trials is the presence of political influence and the association of that influence with victor's justice. 137 Nuremberg defendants attempted to cast their prosecution as the political theatre of the Allied forces even while Justice Röling conceded that the crimes for which the Japanese were being prosecuted were political in nature.
138
Slobodan Milosevic, while being prosecuted at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, was quoted in the trial transcripts saying, "I never heard of indictments that resemble political pamphlets with poor, bad intentions." All of these accusations on the political nature of international 139 criminal courts are meant to attack the validity of the justice prescribed by these institutions and insinuate that the outcome is based on the suggestion of the existence of a sub-textual political function and thus biased.
140
Several prominent scholars, in consideration of these factors, maintain that the contemporary international criminal law system is flawed because of its historical origins and thus is fated to represent a mechanism which will ensure that the existing power distributions created by colonial maldistribution will remain not only unchanged but legitimized by an international legal body. However, these accusations fail to take into account the presence of 141 historical bias throughout national legal systems and throughout the entire body of international relations. It would be a rare justice system indeed that could prove its construction was not, in some facet, biased in nature. Modern courts of international criminal law face the same problem that was faced by the positivist jurists in the colonial era: that sovereignty and the other institutions of international criminal law are not mathematical formulas that can be simply applied to a situation. Thus the definition of international crimes, the choice of specific parties as indictable, and the limitations of 143 144 sovereign immunities will be, to some degree, subjective decisions. The 145 differentiation between contemporary and colonial bias is the ultimate purpose sought in the utilization of the legal mechanism and the motive behind pursuing that purpose. Likewise, critics who cite the political nature of international criminal law as a definitive flaw fail to take into account the fact that all criminal prosecution is in some measure politically motivated by "social power, prosecutorial discretion, or legislative choice." The fact that any crime is 146 dictated in some part by subjective moral views does not make the prosecution of that offense less socially valid. The real danger to the validity and effectiveness of any court is the operation of such an institution outside of the constraints of a homogeneous application of the law. The fault lies not 147 necessarily in a distinctive role for politics in this arena of criminal justice, but with the displayed disregard for history, for context and for the political element altogether.
148
What does it mean to say that international law consists of rules to which sovereigns have acquiesced when certain societies were denied sovereign status? How does international criminal law move forward successfully in light of the negative perception of its justice as a result of these influences? While several scholars would take the approach that no alteration is needed to the current system, this article argues for the advancement of three 149 prescriptive considerations. These include: reassessing and limiting the desired goals of international criminal law, emphasizing culturally relative judicial integration into international criminal law solutions, and furthering efforts to compile and homogenize the jurisprudential contributions of the various courts.
The acceptance and utilization of international criminal law was a precarious process. As the only tool available to access the entirely unaddressed field, it seems natural that it would be hoped that this instrument would be able to simultaneously fulfill the goals of all parties. However, these goals need to be reevaluated and narrowed in light of the limitations and flaws in these conflicting goals which experience has exposed. The most apparent manifestation of this conflict of goals is found in the desire for international courts to fill roles both as a history making instrument and as a nonbiased mechanism of justice. In the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt noted that the history writing function illegitimated the juridical function of the trial. As 150 evidenced by that trial, it is difficult to resolve the different motives between these two goals. In order to preserve access to unbiased and fair justice, it 151 becomes essential to "stream-line" the associated goals to purposes of a legal nature and leave purposes outside the legal sphere to public relations, educational, and academic institutions. 152 One of the most essential components available to international criminal courts to combat existing allegations of neo-colonial motives is an ongoing, manifested commitment on the part of the courts toward integration of culturally relative elements. While Africa does offer the ICC the chance to promote international acceptance of the Court by showcasing an effective justice mechanism, the relation between the ICC and the African content 153 offers the Court waters through which they should tread carefully. The historical relationship of the international community with the various nations of Africa has long been built on unequal footing. As outlined from colonial 154 times through the decolonization process, the equality of legal mechanisms 155. Id. 156. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 17. 157. See Gaeta, supra note 80; Akande, supra note 80. and the interpretation of sovereign rights of these post-colonial nations have often been viewed through an imperial lens. 155 By seeking legitimacy in judicial procedures in the context of postcolonized nations, the ICC and other international criminal courts risk perpetuating this imperial legacy if they are not cautious in their application of legal procedures and fearless in their search for justice of a truly universal and impartial nature. For these reasons, judicial solutions for international criminal law violations should explore the potential of analyzing culturally distinct issues on a case-by-case basis. As evidenced by the frustrations of Carla del Ponte, describing her prevention by political pressures from investigating military abuses carried out by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crimes of this scale do not always neatly fit into the Nuremberg model of victim and criminal. As such, courts must make further efforts to design 156 justice systems that forgo the use of Western-centric perspectives on chain-ofcommand, victim rehabilitation, and other culturally relative issues. It is in stipulating a single methodology, and thus, a single resulting idea of justice that the Court risks injuring its reputation as a universal body.
Above all, jurisdictional issues regarding the reach of the power of the ICC are still undefined and offer the developing body of international criminal law a broad field to remedy residual imperial tendencies, and limit the political influence of Western nations which might be interpreted as neocolonialist. For this reason, the preservation of the judicial contributions of the international courts and tribunals should be preserved, homogenized, and studied. As the Court seeks to pursue its global validity through the prosecution of human rights violations, the developing application of the Court's idea of universal jurisdiction and the boundaries of sovereign immunity are under scrutiny. However, if the jurisdictional limits of the ICC Statute are disregarded and reformed with each new instance to fit the jurisdictional needs of the prosecuting party, not only will this undermine the credibility and justice that the ICC hopes to mete out, but it will also effectively continue the trend of redefining the boundaries of international law to fit the Eurocentric visions of justice envisioned by those nations holding places of highest power within the international community.
CONCLUSION
In a conversation with the popular psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud on the topic of the necessity of war, Albert Einstein postulated that he could see only one way to deal with the superficial problem:
The setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle every conflict arising between nations. . . . But here, at the outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a human institution which, in proportion as the power at its disposal is inadequate to enforce its verdicts, is all the more prone to suffer these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure . . . law and might inevitably go hand in hand, and juridical decisions approach more nearly the ideal justice demanded by the community (in whose name and interests these verdicts are pronounced) insofar as the community has effective power to compel respect of its juridical ideal. . . . Thus I am led to my first axiom: The quest of international security involves the unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action-its sovereignty that is to say-and it is clear beyond all doubt that no other road can lead to such security. 158 Einstein, ever succinctly articulate on a myriad of subjects, seems to have described in minimalistic fashion the words Justice Jackson voiced at the opening of the Nuremburg trials. At that time, both personalities understood 159 that the greatest challenge underlying the success and further development of international criminal law as an effective judicial mechanism would be its inherent threat to the positivist idea of sovereign rights. Under its objective definition, international criminal law addresses interstate conflict, head-ofstate sovereign immunity, suppression of enemies of the state, and many other areas commonly found solely under sovereign prerogative. there is one truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, namely that the actual body of international law, as it stands today, not only is the product of the conscious activity of the European mind, but has also drawn its vital essence from a common source of beliefs, and in both of these aspects it is mainly of Western European origin. 164 As Justice Jackson warned in his opening remarks in the Nuremburg trials, " [t] here is a dramatic disparity between the circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that might discredit our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and temperate." The possibility of this 165 "dramatic disparity" influencing the justice prescribed by international criminal courts is a probability, on account of both the imperial origins of international law and the continued implicit influence of hegemonic political pressures. However, as Antonio Cassese, quoted by Justice Röling, so deftly pointed out when responding to the value of the courts in consideration of their potentially Westernized approach to justice, "half a pie is better than no pie at all." 166 Indeed, international criminal law has proven itself just and ultimately functional in prescribing a constructive form of justice in more ways than it has evidenced a Machiavellian bias. In light of the growing contributions of non-governmental organizations (NGO's), transnational corporations, and 167. Kennedy, supra note 34, at 114-19; Brand, supra note 21. 168. Kennedy, supra note 34, at 112-14 (noting that even in his suggestion that a sovereign-based system should be eradicated Kennedy distinctly lacks realistic examples of alternative approaches).
169. Jackson, supra note 159, at 101.
international organizations to the globalized marketplace and world arena, the positivist idea of sovereignty is diminishing in popularity. It is difficult to 167 visualize international organization strategies without the territorial protections afforded by the doctrine, nevertheless, a shift in the bullet-proof 168 immunities offered by sovereignty to those complicit in crimes deemed of international importance seems realistic. However, until that far-off date when the balance of power shifts from the hands of sovereign identities, international criminal law will be left to navigate the limitations of the doctrine.
In light of this, it is the duty of the international courts to acknowledge both the limitations of the law and the limitations of international criminal tribunals. The long and marketable lists of the goals of international criminal law need to be realistically reevaluated and narrowed in light of the true nature and restrictions of the court system. The jurisprudential contributions of the courts need to be compiled, homogenized, and studied so that clear and structured application of practices can assure that the revocation of sovereign immunities are not exploited under motives of political pressure, and as a manifestation of neo-colonialism. Lastly, due deference must be given to the element of cultural relativism. Although alternative measures to international criminal justice may not offer the global community the same closure and reprieve from guilt, the possibility of other options which might offer culturally specific success should be explored. Economic, rehabilitative and retributive goals as well as culturally specific ideas of justice should be assessed at the national level and the appropriate judicial mechanism prescribed, even if these alternatives prove to be less internationally fashionable.
International criminal law offers the world a potential of universal justice. However, if the issues of political influence and historically integrated bias are not addressed as they impact this maturing body of international law, we risk, as an international community, the very result which Justice Jackson foreshadowed in his opening statement for the prosecution of the Nuremberg Trials. "To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well."
